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THE SUPREME COURT'S SHELL GAME:
THE CONFUSION OF JURISDICTION AND
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS IN SECTION
1983 LITIGATION I
EDNA HUBBARD TRAVIS *
BERNARD ROBERT ADAMS**
In recent years the work load of the federal courts has expanded substan-
tially.' At the same time, there has been increasing concern that the federal
courts have been intruding on the state system in an unwarranted manner.' As
a result, a variety of proposals have been made to cut back on the courts'
jurisdiction to ensure that those cases in need of a federal forum will receive a
hearing in a reasonable period of time.' When issues of controlling access to a
federal forum arise, claims involving "federally" protected rights raise some
difficult issues. The framers of the Constitution viewed the state court system
as an open and available means of ensuring that individuals receive sufficient
protection for federal interests, 4 giving it full power to interpret and apply
federally secured rights, with the Supreme Court as an appellate forum to en-
sure uniform national application.' Inasmuch as two forums are available for
the adjudication of a given claim, a tension exists between the two when a deci-
sion must be made as to which forum is the most appropriate. Whether a
dispute should be heard in either federal or state court depends on such factors
as paramountcy of national interests, deference to state decisionmaking, comi-
ty, congressional intent, and the limited nature of federal jurisdiction. 6
 When
I Copyright © 1983 by Boston College Law School.
" B.A. Wellesley College, J. D. Boston University School of Law.
• * A.B. Brown University, LL.B. Yale Law School.
' During the six month period from July through December, 1981, 97,609 civil cases
were filed, an increase of 11.2% over the same period a year before. This compares with 63,868
filed during the same period in 1977. In fact, the twelve month period which ended December,
1981 represented a record year for civil activity in the United States District Courts. ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 5
(1981).
See, e.g., Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV, 605 (1981) (suggesting the important role which the state courts play in elaborating federal
constitutional principles).
See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION; A GENERAL VIEW (1973); Au
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969).
4 See, e.g., BATOR, MISHKIN, SHAPIRO, & WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-12 and accompanying notes (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER).
5 U. S. Const. art. III, 5 2; see also S 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, An Act to Establish the
Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); D. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL COURTS 1-4 (2d ed. 1975).
6 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2566-67 (1982). For a general discus-
sion of these concerns see HART & WECHSLER pp. 980-1050 passim.
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these various considerations are balanced appropriately in making such a deci-
sion ; the tension between state and federal systems is minimized.
Recently there has been debate over the role of the federal courts in ad-
judicating claims which are potentially cognizable under both section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 7
 and various state common law or statutory theo-
ries. 8
 Increasing numbers of section 1983 cases are being filed 9 where legiti-
mate state-created procedures are available to the litigant for the adjudication
of his claim. These cases provide a particularly acute example of the problems
created by the availability of two forums. One way of dealing with this problem
is to have these cases decided initially by state authorities with the federal
courts serving only as appellate bodies.") This approach, which would involve
the imposition of an exhaustion requirement for section 1983 actions," was re-
jected recently by the Supreme Court." In another line of cases dealing with
procedural due process„" however, the Court has reacted to the work distribu-
tion problem in a manner which is both more far reaching than, and doctrinal-
ly inconsistent with, its stand on exhaustion. Rather than closing the federal
courts jurisdictionally, the Court is taking civil rights cases out of the system by
looking at the merits and rejecting the claims simply because remedies exist at
the state level.' 4
 The Court is in effect mixing substantive constitutional issues
of due process with what should otherwise be procedural decisions based on
statutory jurisdictional issues.' 3
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, S 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 1983
(1981)).
For a sample of recent articles recognizing the concern and proposing suggestions,
see Aldisert,Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal]udge's Thoughts on Section 1983 and the
Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORDER 557: Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under
Section 1983: The State of Mind Requirement, 46 U. C1N. L. REV. 45 (1977); McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitation on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1
(1941); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L. J. 5 (1974); Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277 (1965); Whit-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the
Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969).
9 Between 1961 and 1979, filings under 5 1983 increased from 296 to 13,168 and peti-
tions by state prisoners increased from 218 in 1966 to 11,195 in 1979. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 6, 61. See also Whit-
man, supra note 8, at 6.
" See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
" For a sampling of recent articles dealing with this issue, see Comment, Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (1974); Note, Exhaustion
of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLum, L. REV. 1201 (1968).
12 Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2568 (1982) (held that exhaustion of
state administrative remedies was not required to bring a 5 1983 action in federal court).
See infra notes 94-155 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 94-155 and accompanying text.
15 This conclusion follows from comparing the Court's decision in Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982), with that in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Patsy,
the Court held "exhaustion of state remedies should not be required to bringing an action pur-
suant to 5 1983." Patsy, 102 S. Ct. at 2568. In Parratt, however, the Court determined that the
"Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations without 'due process' of law" and
that, in the case of a negligent deprivation of property by a person acting under color of state law,
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Denying that an exhaustion requirement exists in section 1983 actions yet
allowing those actions to proceed only where no parellel state remedy exists has
serious implications. Not only is doctrinal purity being lost,' 6 there are far
more practical ill effects. In neglecting to adopt a straightforward approach to
section 1983 claims, the Court has created confusion among both litigants and
lower court judges.i 7 Most notably, litigants will proceed with a section 1983
claim believing there is no exhaustion requirement, but will find that their ap-
propriate remedy was, after all, in state court.' 8 Furthermore, this mixture of
jurisdictional issues with what is properly a substantive rights analysis has
dangerous implications to the future of due process. By deciding the merits of
these cases on the existence of a parallel state remedy, the Court is losing the
ability to view the cases flexibly because it is making determinations about the
existence of underlying rights rather than operating at a jurisdictional leve1. 19 It
is locking itself into an approach which will require litigants to win or lose, not
on the significance of the right being affected or the actual harm to the in-
dividual or society, but solely on the existence of a potential parallel state
remedy.
The task facing the court is to decide, on a consistent basis and in a man-
ner consonant with notions of comity, federalism and the role of the Federal
courts as the primary protector of federally created rights, when a claim should
be heard under section 1983. 20 One suggestion is to re-evaluate the type of
no deprivation without due process of law occurs where the state provides an adequate post-
deprivation hearing. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44. These two cases leave litigants in a strange posi-
tion. On the one hand litigants need not exhaust state remedies to bring a 5 1983 claim. On the
other hand, where a 5 1983 litigant is alleging a deprivation of property without due process of
law, the litigant must exhaust state remedies before the actual deprivation without due process of
law — upon which the 5 1983 claim rests — will be deemed by the court to have occurred. The
Court, therefore, has imposed no exhaustion requirement on the statutory grant of federal
jurisdiction over 5 1983 claims, while at the same time it is requiring exhaustion of state remedies
by some litigants before allowing them to claim that their constitutional rights have been
abridged. Accordingly, the Court has acted to restrict claims coming into the federal court under
5 1983 by limiting the constitutional — due process — rights S 1983 was designed to protect, rather
than limiting statutory rights — by imposing a procedural exhaustion requirement — under S
1983 itself. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir.
1983) noted this constitutional dimension of the Pan-att decision when it wrote as follows:
Parratt, of course, did not restrict the availability of 5 1983 ai a remedy for constitu-
tional wrongs. Instead, it held the constitutional requirement of procedural due proc-
ess to be satisfied if the state provides a post facto remedy for an injury inflicted by an
official which was not done pursuant to an established policy and was not amenable
to prior control.
Palmer, at 1222 n.2.
" See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
" Id.
19 For example, to the extent the court determines a post-deprivation state remedy pro-
vides the process due a party under the fourteenth amendment, it has made a constitutional level
determination. Such determinations clearly are not subject to modification by Congress.
" A great deal of discussion in law reviews has been devoted to this issue. For a
sampling and recent articles, see Aldisert, supra note 8; Nahmod, supra note 8; Whitman, supra
note 8; Comment, supra note 11; Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
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right which is constitutionally cognizable, relegating those which are not suffi-
ciently important to require constitutional protection to the state court forum. 2 '
A better approach, perhaps, is simply requiring the exhaustion of remedies
provided by state law." This would entail a showing that the state remedy was
in some way inadequate before a litigant could proceed in federal court with a
claim. 23 Either approach would resolve the present workload and comity prob-
lems while at the same time eliminating the difficult situation which the
Supreme Court has created by its current bifurcated approach. The "exhaus,
tion" solution, however, is the sounder course because it would keep constitu-
tional protections in place but shift the primary responsibility for enforcing
these rights to the state system. Such action would solve the work distribution
issue at the jurisdictional level rather than by redefining constitutional rights.
The federal courts, of course, would be available to assure that uniformity ex-
isted and could step back into the process in the event of any problems or
failures on the part of the state courts. 24
In Parts I and II this article will discuss section 1983 and the problems
which it has engendered and the development of procedural due process.
Then, in Part III, it will demonstrate the manner in which the Court has uti-
lized substantive issues of procedural due process as a means for dealing with
what are really jurisdictional issues, showing that, in light of the developments
in procedural due process, the Court is eroding its own standards — which re-
quire no exhaustion of state remedies — while appearing to adhere to them.
The serious implications of such inconsistent positions then will be analyzed.
This article will conclude with the view that, although the existence of parallel
state and federal remedies in the context of section 1983 cases is seriously in
need of reconsideration, there are other sounder ways of dealing with the prob-
lem than the rationales presently being used by the Court. Most notably, it is
HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1264-74 (1977); Note, supra note 11. Furthermore, the lower courts have
adOpted a number of approaches, see Whitman, supra note 8, at 6-7; see also infra notes 162-67 &
177 and accompanying text. In fact, the attempts by the lower courts to cut back on these cases is
one reason why it is incumbent on the Supreme Court to face the issue head on. Additionally, the
concurring and dissenting opinions of a number of Justices in cases raising these issues reflect a
wide range of solutions that have been suggested. See infra notes 102-06, 149-55 and accompany-
ing text.
" This concept alone incorporates a wide range of possibilities. The definition of con-
stitutionally cognizable interests in "property", created in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972) (interests created and defined by rules or understandings "that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits") may be in need of redefinition.
See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Terrell,
"Property", "Due Process," And the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO.
L. J. 861 (1982). Alternatively, certain interests may not be significant enough to merit constitu-
tional protection, see infra notes 102-06, 154-55, 187 and accompanying text, or the concept of
"deprivation" may be read to exclude negligent deprivations. See infra note 129 and accompany-
ing text.
22 See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
2*
 Individual protections would be preserved as no exhaustion would be required where
no adequate state remedy was found available. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
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suggested that the Court should adopt a modified form of exhaustion require-
ment, requiring that to state a claim under section 1983 the plaintiff must
allege that the state remedies are unavailable or inadequate for the protection
of federal rights.
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In 1871, concerned that the states were not adequately protecting the
rights of minority citizens, 25 Congress enacted The Civil Rights Act of 1871. 26
Section I, now section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code," provides a
private, federal remedy for persons deprived of federal rights under color of
state law. It states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. 28
This statute created a distinct federal statutory remedy for individuals
alleging an impairment of rights secured by the general laws of the federal
government or specific sections of the Constitution. 29 This protection is de-
signed to apply when the wrongdoer is acting in his governmental capacity as
an official of the state." Since its inception, the statute has been coupled with
its own jurisdictional grant. 3 ' This factor eliminated any potential jurisdic-
25 The history of the Civil Rights Act is well documented in Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 665.89 (1978).
26 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and for other Purposes, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
27 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, S 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1983
(1964)). Section 1983 was originally introduced as S 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and was a
reaction to the increased activity of the Ku Klux Klan. See Monett v. New York City Dept of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
28 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1981).
29 id.
'° Id.
5 ' The statute's jurisdictional counterpart provides as follows:
[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction on any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person ... (3) to redress the deprivation, under color of
any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing by equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States. . .
28 U.S.C. 1343(3) (1976 & Supp. 1982). In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600, 616-20 (1979), the Court made it clear that 5 1343(3) was not simply the jurisdictional
counterpart of S 1983 since S 1983 protects against wrongs with respect to "laws," not merely
equal rights laws and is therefore applicable to any claim alleging federally protected rights. This
effectively removed the jurisdictional impediment, normally present at that time, to federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, which arose because of the existence of the "amount in controversy" require-
ment. A 1980 amendment to 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 eliminated the need for jurisdictional amount in
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tional barriers to civil rights claims and enabled anyone asserting a deprivation
of a right secured by the statute to be assured of a federal forum to adjudicate
the claim. 32
For many years section 1983 went largely unrecognized, having been
given a narrow reading which permitted its use only in cases alleging racial
discrimination or voting rights restrictions." Then, in Hague v. C.1.0. 34 it was
found applicable to a claim by labor organizers asserting a constitutional right
to assemble and distribute literature. This reading substantially broadened the
applicability of the statute by adding a new set of rights for which section 1983
would grant relief. All challenged state actions, however, were still grounded
on state statutes or local ordinances, and therefore fell within the most restric-
tive interpretation of the "under color of state law" language of section 1983. 35
That is, for any given course of conduct by a state official to be actionable un-
der section 1983, the conduct in question had to be sanctioned by the state. 36
. In 1961, in Monroe a. Pape," the Court recognized a section 1983 claim
which fundamentally changed the type of activity which was actionable under
the statute. Monroe was brought by an Illinois resident seeking damages against
the City of Chicago and individual Chicago policemen for an allegedly un-
constitutional search of his home. The Court held that the policemen's con-
duct, although not taken pursuant to any state or local statute or ordinance,
constituted action "under the color of state law."'" The Court also noted that
individuals alleging constitutional deprivations under section 1983 could go
forward under the federal statute even though the state courts also provided an
alternative forum for litigation of the plaintiff's grievances." In this regard the
Court stated that, with respect to the validity of a claim under section 1983, it
was "no answer that the State has a law which, if enforced, would give relief.
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."" In reaching
this conclusion, the Court set forth what it viewed as the purposes of the Civil
all federal question cases. See 28 U.S.C.A.	 1331 (1982 Supp.).
" Although originally interpreted to apply to state officials acting pursuant to state or
local law, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-85 (1961), has extended 5 1983 to cover the actions
of local officials and Monell v. New York City Dep. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ex-
tended the reach of 5 1983 to local governmental entities.
" See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See generally, Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1336-43 (1952).
34 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
" See Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133,
1159-69 (1977).
3° Id. at 1160-61.
37 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
" Id. at 187.
" Id. at 183.
4° Id. The Court rejected Justice Frankfurter's dissenting argument, id. at 202, that the
suit should first be brought in state court and that the illegality of the act would deprive the state
officer of any immunity he would have had by virtue of his official position.
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Rights Act, one of which "was to provide a federal remedy where the state
remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. " 41 After
Monroe, therefore, the challenged action of the state official did not have to be
officially sanctioned by the state, either directly, that is expressly by statute or
regulative, or indirectly, by being upheld in state court as appropriate under
state law.
One of the rights most readily implicated by litigants availing themselves
of this expanded section 1983 cause of action is the fourteenth amendment's
prohibition against the taking of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." The due process clause applies to a wide range of interests attached to di-
verse procedural protections 43 and, therefore, the provision has easily become
the vehicle through which these section 1983 claims are asserted. Section 1983
due process claims fall into two general categories. The first group, exemplified
by Barry v. Barchi," are in essence claims that the established state procedures
in themselves are unconstitutional and violate due process protections for one
reason or another. 45 The asserted violation may be an allegedly biased
system," or the system may not have sufficient procedural safeguards:" Al-
though these claims could have been brought in state court, as constitutional
challenges to the state process itself, they can also be brought in federal court.
Moreover, under traditional exhaustion doctrine the federal forum is prefer-
able, since these cases fall into the category exempting the exhaustion require-
ment where the constitutionality of state relief itself is called into question. 48
Monroe v. Pape, however, made federal forums available for cases which
were essentially tort claims performed by state actors. Consequently, another
type of due process case is being brought into federal court under section 1983.
These cases, exemplified by Paul v. Davis," Parratt v. Taylor," and Rutledge v.
Arizona Board of Regents, 5 ' are essentially causes of action for assault and battery,
conversion, or defamation which have been transformed into due process
claims actionable in federal court under section 1983 since the tortfeasor is an
41 Id. at 174. The other two delineated purposes were to enable federal courts to over-
ride certain kinds of state laws and to provide a remedy where the state law was inadequate. Id. at
173-74.
42 U.S Const. amend. XIV, 1.
43 See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
44. 443 U.S. 55, 62-64 (1979).
" See also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97
(2d Cir. 1980); Dobosz v. DelMonte, 509 F. Supp. 964 (D. Conn. 1981).
46 See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Dobosz v. DelMonte, 509 F.
Supp. 964, 970 (D. Conn. 1981).
47 See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1980).
44 See Swan. v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97, 102-04 (2d Cir. 1980). See also infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
49 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
50 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See Note, Defining the Parameters of § 1983: Parratt v. Taylor, 23
B.C. L. REV. 1219 (1982).
41 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
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individual acting in an "official" capacity. As a result, litigants with griev-
ances against any state entity or individual often proceed immediately into fed-
eral court without first utilizing available state administrative or judicial reme-
dies. 52
There has been a mounting concern among commentators" and the
courts" that the existence of these parallel forms of relief may be an unfortu-
nate development. 55 Not only does it burden the federal courts with claims
which may well be as competently adjudicated in the state courts," but it has
the effect of relegating the state court system into an inferior position, 57 con-
trary to the theory of comity with which the two systems were created." When
section 1983 was enacted there was a perceived need to keep the federal courts
open and available to provide a corrective process for abuses by government of-
ficials." This concern persisted through the "civil rights era" of the 1950's and
early 1960's when Monroe was decided." Section 1983 may have "burst its his-
torical bounds," however, inasmuch as the federal courts, arguably, no longer
need to play this role in cases with no civil rights overtones." As a result, com-
mentators" have suggested means to distinguish these claims from those in
need of federal protection and to avoid "trivializing" the Civil Rights Act" by
turning the federal courts into `longs] of tort law." 65
One way to cut back on section 1983 claims which involve matters of es-
sentially state law is the imposition of a requirement that remedies available in
state court be exhausted before a section 1983 claim can be brought in federal
court. Exhaustion, in its traditional sense, requires a litigant first to pursue an
available administrative remedy before a court will act. 66 The requirement is,
" This preference for the federal system is supported by a number of rationales which
are independent of the type of claims at issue or the jurisdictional means implemented. Some of
the reasons suggested are that federal judges are more competent, and more independent in
resisting popular and political pressure. See, Bator, supra note 2, at 607; Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Whitman, supra note 8, at 23 & n.108.
33 See supra note 20.
33 See cases discussed in sources collected at supra note 20.
55 See supra note 20. See also, Aldisert, supra note 8, at 560-62; Whitman, supra note 8, at
9-11.
36 See Whitman, supra note 8, at 25; Aldisert, supra note 8, at•560-62. ("If federal judicial
intervention [in civil rights cases] is at all necessary, it is questionable whether intervention
should be allowed to take the form of a litigant's Pavlovian recourse to federal courts.").
" See Aldisert, supra note 8, at 558-63.
38 Id.
39
 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
▪ Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (reflecting on the concern of the Civil
Rights Act that the state remedy, although adequate in appearance, would not be adequate in
practice and concluding that the fact that Illinois had a law which, if enforced, would give relief
was "no barrier to the present suit in the federal court", id. at 183).
61 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
62 See discussions presented in sources collected at supra notes 8 and 20.
43 Id.
• Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
63
 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
66 See, McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); Meyers v. Bethlemen Ship-
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however, riddled with exceptions." Where the prescribed administrative
remedy is inadequate, exhaustion will not be required," nor will it be required
where the state procedure itself is being challenged." In the context of a section
1983 action, "exhaustion of state remedies" has come to incorporate both
"administrative" 70 and "judicial"" exhaustion. In Monroe v. Pape, the Court
had emphatically stated that state created judicial remedies were irrelevant to
whether the claim could be brought in federal court. 72 Similarly, in McNeese u.
Board of Education," a school desegregation case brought two years later in
which the plaintiffs had available both administrative and judicial remedies at
the state level in addition to their section 1983 claim, the Court found that
neither procedure need be exhausted. 74
More recently, in Patsy v. Board of Regents," the Court had occasion to re-
consider its holdings in McNeese and Monroe. Patsy was an equal protection case
brought by a white female teacher alleging sex discrimination. Although the
state university system provided a grievance procedure, the plaintiff had not
availed herself of it and had proceeded directly into federal court with her
claim. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a rehearing en banc, 76
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
" For a discussion of other exceptions, see Patsy v. Florida Intn'l University, 634 F.2d
900, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1981), ra 'd sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982);
Comment, supra note 1, at 538-40.
69 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE S 20.07 (1958 & Supps. 1970, 1976
and 1978).
69 Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958); Swan v.
Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 1980) ("given this attack on the constitutional adequacy of
the remedies that are available, we conclude that it would be pointless to require [plaintiffs] to ex-
haust those remedies"). 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISES 20.04 (1958 & Supps.
1970, 1976 and 1978).
70 In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982), the Court was urged to impose
an administrative exhaustion requirement. It was suggested that it would lessen the burden on
the federal courts by 5 1983, further comity and improve federal-state relations, and enable the
agency, with perceived expertise, to enlighten the federal court. Id. at 2566.
" Judicial exhaustion requires a litigant to pursue judicial remedies at the state court
level. Although not traditionally considered as included in the doctrine of exhaustion, it has
become part of exhaustion concerns in civil rights cases, possibly because of confusion with the
related area of abstention. See Note, supra note 11, at 1205. Judicial exhaustion has traditionally
been more problematic than has administrative exhaustion because state court judgments are ac-
corded res judicata effect. However, recently in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 1883 (1982) the Court held that administrative determinations which have been reviewed
under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard by the state courts also carry such effect. In fact,
decisions of administrative tribunals, at both state and federal levels, are now entitled to preclu-
sive effect. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). See also 2 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE S 18.04, at 569 (1958).
72 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
" 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
74 Id. at 670-72.
" 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
76 The district court had dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A
panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 612 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981). Then, in a
rehearing en bane, vacated the panel decision and remanded with instructions. Patsy v. Florida
Intn'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981).
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considered the full line of Supreme Court precedent" and determined that a
plaintiff who had not exhausted available state administrative remedies would
be required to show that they were, in some way, inadequate or inappro-
priate. 78 The case was remanded to give Patsy the opportunity to demonstrate
that the state administrative grievance procedure was inadequate. 79
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court in Patsy, relying heavily on
congreSsional intent," and emphatically reiterating that there was no require-
ment that state administrative remedies be exhausted in section 1983 actions. 8 '
Although Patsy did not involve judicial remedies, the Court relied on Monroe"
and McNeese, 83 both of which involved judicial as well as administrative reme-
dies. Moreover, the court had recently addressed the judicial exhaustion re-
quirement in Board of Regents v. Tomanio. 84 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that its decision applies to all state created remedies whether administrative or
judicial.
Although a much heralded decision," Patsy, is significant only for what it
did not do. The Court's refusal to accept the suggestion that it reconsider Mon-
roe and McNeese, and deal with the mounting comity and workload issues on a
jurisdictional level, is indicative of its decision to rely on another method of ap-
proaching these problems. In another line of cases — those dealing with proce-
dural due process — the Court had already begun to address its concerns about
workload and intrusion into the state domain as part of its substantive constitu-
tional analysis rather than on a statutory jurisdictional level. This approach
can be seen by reviewing the Court's recent decisions involving procedural due
process.
" Id, at 902-10.
" The court reasoned, in a lengthy opinion considering the earlier precedents, that
adequate and appropriate state administrative remedies must be exhausted before a 5 1983 action
could proceed in federal court. Id, at 912. The court noted, however, the traditional exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine, one of which was the inadequacy of the state administrative remedy, Id.
at 912-14. In light of the fact that there was no indication of whether the state remedy was ade-
quate or not, the case was remanded for a showing of adequacy of administrative remedies. Id. at
914.
7" Id. at 914.
"a Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2561-66 (1982). The Court relied on
legislative history of both the 1871 Congress and the history of The Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997.1997 (1976) (specific, limited exhaustion requirement
enacted,	 1997(e)).
a' Patsy, 102 S. Ct. at 2568.
as Id. at 2563.
" 3
 Id. at 2560.
S4 446 U.S. 478, 491 (1980) (reiterating that there would be no judicial exhaustion re-
quirement in such cases).
" On June 22, 1982, the day after the decision was rendered, The New York Times
carried a front page article on the decision. Greenhouse, Supreme Court Eases Path of Those Filing
Civil Rights Actions, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1982, 5 1, at 1, col. 6. In it the author states that the
decision was "important because a series of modern Supreme Court decisions have greatly ex-
panded the usefulness and scope of the 111-year old statute. At the same time, these decisions
raised concern that Federal courts were being overburdened by lawsuits." Id.
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H. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, among
other things, prohibits the deprivation by the government of the life, liberty or
property of any individual without due process of law. 86 At its most basic, this
prohibition, enacted to ensure the individual against state governmental
abuse," means that before an individual is deprived of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, the state government must afford him certain procedural pro-
tection. These processes must be adequate to enable the individual to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
When an individual claims that a right has been violated, the analysis
typically proceeds along two lines." Does the claim involve a right protected by
the Constitution and, if so, has the individual been denied due process with
respect to the claim." Depending on the significance of the right affected, the
type and extent of these procedures differ." Generally, the Court has applied a
balancing test to aid its resolution of the issue: the more essential the interest,
the more process is clue."
One way of approaching this balancing process was to focus on the timing
of the hearing required." This approach was adopted first in Sniadach u. Family
Finance Corporation." There, the Court invalidated a state statute permitting
garnishment of wages without notice and a hearing for the debtor, finding that
the affected individual must be granted a hearing prior to the action by the
government." Similarly, in Goldberg v. Kelly96 the Court held unconstitutional a
state act permitting the termination of welfare benefits without a prior hearing,
stating that a pre-termination hearing was required." Bell v. Burson 98 dealt with
the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing the suspension, without a
prior hearing, of drivers' licenses where drivers involved in accidents lacked
proof of financial responsibility or failed to post security. There the Court re-
quired a prior hearing to determine the probability of an ultimate judgment
against the individual."
Goss v. Lopezt°° raised the issue of the procedural rights due high school
96
 U.S. CONST. amend, XIV, 5 1.
" See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977)..
88 Armstrong v. Manzo; 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
"g See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).
g° Id.
91 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502 (1978).
97 Id. at 532-63. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. .319, 335 (1976) (Court set forth
four-part balancing test).
" See infra notes 138.70 and accompanying text.
94 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
95 Id. at 342.
96 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
97 Id. at 254-60.
98 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
99 Id. at 542.
1 " 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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students prior to suspension. There the Court upheld the student's rights to
some kind of pre-suspension hearing, but clearly imposed minimal procedural
protections. 10 ' In a dissent which was to foreshadow subsequent concerns with
the Court's approach in this area, Justice Powell indicated that the interests in-
volved in the case were not sufficient to merit constitutional scrutiny,'" being
merely routine issues of school discipline.'" He took the Court to task for plac-
ing undue emphasis on procedural considerations rather than focusing on the
substantive quality of the right being violated.'" Because he felt that the
students had suffered no "grievous loss"'" he questioned whether they had
been deprived of anything sufficiently significant to merit constitutional protec-
tion.'"
Since then the Court has accepted the principle that, at least where some
interests are concerned, a "post-deprivation" hearing, prior to the final depri-
vation, will be sufficient to satisfy due process. The issue of pre-termination, as
contrasted with post-termination, hearings was first introduced in Arnett v. Ken-
nedy.'°7 There, in a case involving a discharged government employee, the
Court determined that where a constitutionally cognizable property right has
procedural limitations built into it, certain restrictions on it are constitutionally
acceptable, since they are inextricably tied up with the very grant of that right
by the government.'" There were, however, multiple opinions in the case,'"
and a suggestion on the part of a number of concurring justices that they
viewed the termination as acceptable only as long as there was an opportunity
for review of the initial decision to dismiss before the employee was permanent-
ly terminated."°
101
 The Court required, in connection with suspensions of ten days or less, merely oral
or written notice of charges and an explanation of the evidence and an opportunity for the stu-
dent to present his version. If prior notice and hearing, however, were not feasible, they should
follow "as soon as practicable." Id. at 582-84.
102 Id. at 587 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'"' See id. at 600 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104
 Id. at 595-97 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell felt that the state statute set forth pro-
cedures which were fully as substantial as the minimal ones which the Court imposed and that
the Court's procedural emphasis was thus unnecessary.
L'" Id. at 587-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 589 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1 " 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
'" Id. at 151-54.
109 Justice Rehnquist was joined in the opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stewart. Id. at 136. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in part and
concurred in the result in part. Id. at 164. Justice Douglas dissented, id. at 203, as did Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. Id. at 206.
11 ° Justice Powell, anticipating his opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), felt that, upon balance, the employee's right to a hearing after removal was sufficient and
that under those circumstances a prior evidentiary hearing was not constitutionally required.
Arnett, at 170-71 (Powell, J., concurring). See infra note 112. Similarly, Justice White's concur-
rence focused on the timing of the hearing and expressed the view that a hearing "at some time
before a competitive civil service employee may be finally terminated for misconduct" is re-
quired, but that it did not need to be held prior to discharge. Id. at 185 (White, J., concurring).
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Subsequently, this principle — that review prior to final termination
might be all that the Constitution required — was adopted in Mathews v.
Eldridge."' There, in a decision in which he attempted to balance the needs of
the individual against those of society, Justice Powell introduced a four-step
test"' to evaluate the timing of a hearing. Applying the test, the Court found
that a post-deprivation hearing, held prior to the time a final decision was
reached but subsequent to the termination of benefits, satisfied the due process
rights of individuals threatened with termination of disability payments."'
By 1979, post-deprivation hearings were held to satisfy the due process
clause in a number of diverse cases. In Mackey v. Montrym" 4 a post-suspension
hearing on the suspension of drivers' licenses where individuals had refused to
take a drunk driving test was declared adequate."' Barry v. Barchi" 6 held that a
race horse trainer suspended for illegal drugs detected in a horse was entitled to
no more than a post-suspension hearing." 7 With respect to the timing of the
administrative hearing, the Court had modified its approach and was begin-
ning to consider the adequacy of post-deprivation remedies as a means of pro-
viding due process.
At the same time, the Court had also begun to look at state judicial reme-
dies as sufficient on their own to satisfy due process concerns. Paul v. Davis, 18
for example, was a section 1983 due process case in which the claimant asserted
a defamation claim against a state official who had allegedly injured his reputa-
tion by posting his name on a list of shoplifters sent to local merchants. 19 Al-
though the case was decided against the plaintiff on the grounds that his inter-
est in his reputation did not rise to the level of constitutional scrutiny, ' 2° the
Court's reasoning proved both illuminating and prophetic. In Part I of his
opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that "respondent's complaint would appear
to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually
every state.'" 2 ' In Part II, the Justice considered the two possible bases on
which the Court of Appeals could have bottomed its holding for the claimant.
He characterized the'first as representing the view that the Due Process Clause
and section 1983 somehow "make actionable many wrongs inflicted by govern-
ment employees which had heretofore been thought to give rise only to state
" 1 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
" 2 The Mathews test involved four factors: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk
that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results; (3) the probable value of the procedural
safeguard suggested; (4) the governmental interest affected. Id. at 335.
" 3 Id. at 349.
14 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
" 3 Id. at 19.
"e 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
'" Id. at 66-68.
'" 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
" 9 Id. at 697.
' 20 Id. at 712.
1 " Id. at 697.
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law claims. "122 Justice Rehnquist then rejected the possibility that the four-
teenth amendment by itself and without allegation of any other specific con-
stitutional deprivation' 23 could be read so as to turn it into "a font of tort law to
be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States." 124 The Justice then turned to the second possibility, the existence of a
protectible liberty interest, which he found lacking.'" Although the absence of
any such protectible interest by itself precluded the presentation of a valid
cause of action under the fourteenth amendment, the Court's analysis also
gave rise to the notion that unless a state procedure was itself challenged, a
fourteenth amendment cause of action could be precluded where state pro-
cedures existed.
The dissent by Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and White
concurred, attacked the majority approach to the extent that it was based to
any degree on the existence of a state remedy for defamation; 125 seeing any
such reliance as a direct departure from Monroe v. Pape.' 27 The dissent went on
to say:
Indeed, even if the Court were creating a novel doctrine that the state
law is in any way relevant, it would be incumbent upon the Court to
inquire whether respondent has an adequate remedy under Kentucky
law or whether petitioner would be immunized by state doctrines of
official or sovereign immunity. The Court, however, undertakes no
such inquiry. 128
The dissent recognized that the majority was influenced by the availability of
remedies in the state court system in determining the merits of section 1983 due
process claims. 129
This analysis was continued a year later in Ingraham v. Wright.'" There, in
a due process case brought under section 1983, school children challenged
school authorities' use of physical punishment. ' 3 ' Although not referring to
Paul v. Davis, the Court found that even though a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest was involved, due process was satisfied through the existence of a
state tort remedy. 132 In an important dissent, Justice Stevens noted that where
a property right was concerned, a post-deprivation remedy may be all that due
122 Id. at 699.
' 2 ' Id. at 700-01.
124 Id. at 701.
' 2' Id. at 712.
126 Id. at 715 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 715 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)).
1 " Id. at 715.
129 Id.
"D 430 U.S 651 (1977).
13 ' Id. at 653.
1'2 Id. at 682. ("We conclude that the due process clause does not require notice and a
hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public schools as that practice is
authorized and limited by the common law.").
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process requires.'" He then went on to say that in the liberty context also, it
now appeared that Paul v. Davis had been correctly decided, but for the wrong
reasons; the proper reason now being that the existence of an adequate state
tort remedy would provide all the process that was due where reputational in-
terests were involved.'"
The Ingraham Court equated due process with the availability of legal
relief. In making its due process analysis the Court looked not to a subsequent
administrative process but instead to the availability of state judicial
remedies. 13 ' That due process could be satisfied in this latter manner amounts
to a significant doctrinal leap which can be best understood by examining two
recent cases, one of the Supreme Court 136 building on Ingraham and one by the
Ninth Circuit"' in which the Circuit Court followed what it viewed as Su-
preme Court teaching.
In Parratt v. Taylor,'" a section 1983 case brought by a state prisoner for
the negligent loss of a twenty-three dollar hobby kit, the Court had an oppor-
tunity to retreat from its apparent formalistic reliance on parallel state reme-
dies. As the concurring opinions indicate," 9 the Court could have decided the
case on a number of grounds.'" Nonetheless, it held specifically both that a
constitutionally cognizable property right was implicated"' and that negligent
actions were covered under the purview of section 1983. 142 The Court went on,
however, to state that because the prisoner had a state court remedy for the
property loss, he was not deprived of his property without due process."' Ac-
cordingly it dismissed the claim for failure to allege a constitutional
violation.'"
In holding as it did the Court specifically noted that the state entity had
not had an opportunity to address the issue before the claimant proceeded into
federal court."' Consequently, the Court distinguished the case as involving a
deprivation resulting from failure to follow established state procedure rather
than the result of following state procedure.'" That is, the procedure itself is
not being attacked, but rather the attack is upon the unauthorized action of the
state official.'" This was a surprising distinction to be made at this juncture in
193 Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., di ssenting).
14 Id. at 701-02 (Stevens, J. , dissenting).
135
 Id. at 675.
16 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.
' 37 Rutledge v. Arizona Bd.
19$ 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
139 See infra notes 149-55 and
1 " See infra notes 149-55 and
1 " Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.
l" Id. at 534-35.
"' Id. at 543-44.
"44
 Id.
145 Id.
1 " Id. at 541, 543.
"7
 Id.
S. 527 (1981). See Note, supra note 50.
of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
S. 527, 536-37 (1981).
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section 1983 development. After Monroe v. Pape, allegations involving this latter
type of random, as contrasted with authorized, behavior have been regularly
brought under that provision.'"
Justice Powell concurred, but only because he felt that negligent acts did
not constitute deprivation of property within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.'" He referred to the "somewhat disturbing implication in the
Court's opinion concerning the scope of due process guarantees.'" 5° Noting
that the Court analyzed the case solely in terms of procedural rights,' 51
"fail[ing] altogether to discuss the possibility that the kind of state action al-
leged here constituted a violation of the substantive guarantees of the Due
Process clause,'" 52
 he was concerned that the Court was putting an artificial
emphasis on procedure rather than substantive merit in adjudicating these
claims.'" Justice Stewart also concurred, but on different grounds. He felt that
the property loss involved was not the kind of deprivation to which the four-
teenth amendment was addressed 154
 but added that, even if it were, by making
a reparations remedy available, the state had provided all the process that was
due.'"
The significance of Parratt is evident in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion,
Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents." 6 In Rutledge, a scholarship athlete sued the
state university in federal court under section 1983 on a number of grounds.
Among the various claims asserted were allegations of assault and battery, de-
motion, harrassment, defamation, and deprivation of his scholarship without a
hearing. Although the court's approach to all four of these claims is indicative
of the lower courts' current handling of section 1983 claims,'" its treatment of
the assault and battery allegations demonstrates the effect of Panutt v. Taylor.
'" See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
149
 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
felt that negligent losses were not "deprivations" in the constitutional sense, distinguishing "ac-
tive" and "passive" deprivations. Id. at 546-54.
"9
 Id. at 552.
'" Id. at 547 ("the Court suggests a narrow, wholly procedural view of the limitation
imposed on the states by the Due Process Clause") and at 552.
152 Id. at 553. (Powell, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 550-51 n.8.
i" Id. at 554. (Stewart, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 545. (Stewart, J., concurring).
' 36
 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
157
 The court approached the demotion, deprivation of scholarship, and harassment
claims in the way that has become a standard approach of the federal courts to these cases,
holding that no constitutional rights were involved. Id. at 1352-53. The court found no state-
created liberty or property right in a particular position on a football team and buttressed its con-
clusion by stating that the demotion was not a "grievous loss", citing Goss v. Lopez (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Id. at 1353. With respect to the harassment and defamation claim the court cited
Paul v. Davis, finding that any transgressions constituted nothing more than a tort which the
state may protect against. Id. The claim of deprivation of scholarship was rejected by the court,
for failing to allege adequately an interest in "liberty" or "property" coupled with a deprivation
of that interest. Id.
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The court simply cited Parratt" 8 and stated that although the plaintiff's "liber-
ty" interest may have been implicated, his due process rights would be satisfied
through the "postdeprivation hearing available under the law of the state of
Arizona." 159 The court stated:
The Supreme Court in Parratt v. Taylor indicated that when no prac-
tical way to provide a pre-deprivation hearing exists, a postdepriva-
don hearing provided at a 'meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner' will suffice. (citation omitted) The issue becomes merely
whether the remedies available under Arizona law and in the Arizona
courts constitute the postdeprivation hearing required by the Four-
teenth Amendment. As already mentioned, counsel have informed us
that certain proceedings growing out of the incidents related by the
complaint before us already have taken place. This indicates not only
the existence of postdeprivation remedies under Arizona law, but also
that appellant has pursued those remedies. Thus, our task is made
less difficult than that of the Parratt Court, which relied on the mere
existence of state tort procedures to find that due process concerns
had been met, despite the plaintiffs failure to take advantage of those
procedures. In the instant case, since appellant has sought redress in
the Arizona state courts, and in the absence of suggestion that the
postdeprivation procedures under state law are deficient, we must
conclude that the alleged deprivation was not without due process of
law. That the effect of our holding is to relegate appellant to his tort
law remedy under Arizona law for Kush's alleged assault and battery
should suprise no one. That is the consequence of
. Parratt v. Taylor as
applied to this action of Kush.'"
In effect, the court assumed that Rutledge had a protected interest and pro-
ceeded to find that the existence of a state tort remedy was an adequate protec-
tion for that interest. Rutledge was unable to state a claim under section 1983
because there existed no violation of the due process clause itself.
In two subsequent cases"' the confusing situation left by Parratt is well-
documented. Without mentioning Rutledge, another Ninth Circuit panel in
Wakinekona v. Olim, 162 dealt with an appeal by a state prisoner who claimed that
he had been denied the independent decisionmaker required by the state regu-
lations at his hearing before his transfer out-of-state. 163 In determining that a
liberty interest was implicated and that the prisoner stated a claim under sec-
356
 Id. at 1352.
133 Id.
166 Id.
161 Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981) (as amended on denial of rehear-
ing and rehearing en banc); Pantoja v. City of Gonzales, 538 F. Supp. 335 (N.D Calif, 1982).
362 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en
bane).
163 Id. at 709.
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tion 1983, the court, on a petition for rehearing, distinguished Parratt as having
implicated a property rather than a liberty interest. 164 Nonetheless, the court
went on to note that in Parratt there was general language to the effect that if a
deprivation occurs "because a state fails to follow its procedure rather than
because it follows its procedure, and there is a state court remedy, then the
state has provided all the process that is due.' 165 To state a claim under section
1983 implicating an interest protected by due process, one must attack either
the state procedure itself or allege a violation for which there is no remedy pro-
vided by the state.
In framing Parratt in this manner, the court is recognizing that the Su-
preme Court was drawing a novel distinction. Where the allegation of depriva-
tion is based on an unconstitutional state procedure or practice, the federal
courts appropriately adjudicate and, in fact, no exhaustion is ever required. 166
For the first time, however, the Court was addressing the common law tortious
act by the official and saying that where a state judicial remedy is provided,
and its legitimacy not challenged, due process is afforded. Significantly, the
Wakinekona court went on to state that to read Parratt as any broader than the
context in which it was made, that of a tortious deprivation of proper-
ty for which the state provided a tort remedy ... would remit all
§ 1983 cases to state courts whenever the conduct complained of
violated state law as well as the federal Constitution. The result
would be to read into § 1983 a requirement of exhaustion that has
consistently been rejected by the federal court.' 67
The court in Wakinekona thus recognized that the effect of Parratt might be the
equivalent of imposing an exhaustion requirement upon section 1983 actions
based on misconduct, albeit at a different stage in the proceeding. Evidently
not wishing to adopt any such requirement, the court distinguished Parratt.' 68
In another case involving a district court in the Ninth Circuit, Pantoja v.
City of Gonzales,'" the court cited the language of Wakinekona, but failed to
recognize the point contained in the passage which it quoted, thus embracing
the supposed distinction between exhaustion and due process — that between
jurisdiction and the merits — flowing from Parratt. The court stated:
It is important to keep in mind that Parratt is not an exhaustion case.
The issue there was not whether state remedies had to be pursued
before a federal court action could be maintained ... Rather the
164 Id. at 715.
161 Id.
1 " See supra notes 48, 69 and accompanying text.
167 Wakinekona v. Ohm, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981).
166 The court observed, "In short, Parratt is simply a different case from the present
one." Id.
'69
	 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Calif. 1982).
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issue was whether the availability of certain post-deprivation state
remedies was sufficient to render the alleged deprivation one not
without due process of law.'"
The fact that exhaustion and due process issues are viewed as separate by
the lower courts signals how confusing the Supreme Court's approach has
been. This analytic confusion has successfully lulled both litigants and jurists
into believing that these two issues are distinct, leading to the conclusion that
the availability of parallel state remedies is properly considered in determining
due process issues on their merits, while at the same time having no relevance
to access to the federal courts under the exhaustion doctrine.
III. THE DANGERS OF MIXING JURISDICTIONAL
DOCTRINES WITH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
The interrelationship of these purportedly unrelated lines of cases is readi-
ly apparent. As a result of the holdings of Patsy, McNeese, and Monroe, it appears
that the availability of alternative state relief is irrelevant to a claim under sec-
tion 1983. 17 ' Nonetheless, the outcome of the procedural due process cases
casts substantial doubt on the real effect of the Patsy holding. Although parallel
state remedies may be irrelevant for jurisdictional questions, the Court has
chosen to deal with them in a much more comprehensive and hidden manner.
Concerned about the problem of parallel remedies'" and their impact on the
federal system, yet reluctant to overrule or reconsider Monroe and McNeese, the
Court has opted to interject state law procedural remedies as a solution to work
load and other problems of the federal courts on a substantive constitutional,
rather than jurisdictional, basis. The result is anomalous. One need not ex-
haust one's subsequent state administrative or judicial remedies before pro-
ceeding into federal court under section 1983. The very existence of such a
state-based remedy, however, causes the court to conclude, where the constitu-
tionality of the state procedures are not challenged, that the claimant has no
right to recovery, as no violation of the due process clause will be deemed to
have occurred. This is the teaching of Paul v. Davis, Ingraham v. Wright, and Par-
rail v. Taylor. It is a back door method of re-introducing parallel state remedies,
but at the substantive, rather than the jurisdictional level. In essence the Court
is solving a jurisdictional, work distribution problem by abolishing the under-
lying cause of action.'" There is no federal jurisdiction and no recourse to fed-
10 Id. at 338 n.5.
'" See supra notes 37-41, 64-72, 75-85 and accompanying text.
"2 That the Court is concerned is well documented. This was the basis of Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape. See supra note 40. As early as Paul v. Davis, Justice
Rehnquist expressed concern that the federal courts were being asked to create "a font of tort law
to be superimposed [on] ... the States." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). See also infra
note 183 and accompanying text.
"3
 This is distinctly similar to the Burger Court's approach to other "jurisdictional" .
and work distribution issues. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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eral court if there is no federal claim at issue. This is jurisprudentially inappro-
priate. Such action results in eliminating constitutional protections rather than
determining only whether the constitutional protections should be enforced by
a state or a federal court.
Several distinct problems arise from the Court's recent integration of pro-
cedural due process and section 1983 cases. The holding in Monroe v. Pape is
severely undercut and doctrinal purity is being lost. On a practical level, the
workload of the federal courts is in no way substantially reduced, and litigants
are misled about the relief available to them in federal court. Finally, pro-
cedural due process protections are diluted.
Although pretending to adhere to Monroe, the Court has, in essence,
begun to disregard the case. The Court is maintaining the appearance of an
open door but shutting the federal courts as avenues from which to obtain relief
by leaving the statutory federal remedy intact but restricting its constitutional,
substantive, underpinnings. Moreover, the Court's current approach pays no
heed to the actual adequacy or inadequacy of the state remedy, thereby
disregarding one of Monroe's basic tenets. 14 In Parratt v. Taylor the Court ad-
dressed this concern, making its position clear. It stated:
[allthough the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all
the relief which may have been available if he could have proceeded
under § 1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not ade-
quate to satisfy due process. The remedies provided could have fully
compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we
hold that they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due proc-
ess. (emphasis added)."s
Thus, the mere potential availability of a forum, without more, is sufficient to
meet the constitutional requirement of procedural due process and preclude a
section 1983 action.
Moreover, the mingling of issues of substance with issues of jurisdiction
has always been disfavored. "6 By treating jurisdictional considerations of com-
ity and workload at the substantive level, that is, in making determinations on
the merits in individual cases, the Court is actually expanding its workload at
the access level in contravention of its goals, while narrowing substantive
rights. The removal of rights is not an appropriate way of solving questions of
comity or work distribution. These issues are properly treated as system-wide
problems, not as issues upon which to decide the merits of individual cases.
In addition to the question of legal inconsistency, there are far more
dangerous practical and theoretical implications of mixing substance and
"4 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 715
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 73 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
16 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
520 (1975). See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 680-85 (1946) for the Court's discussion of such
problems.
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jurisdiction in this manner. As noted, confusion for litigants is likely to
result.'" Believing that the lack of an exhaustion requirement signals an open
and responsive approach to civil rights claims by the federal courts, claimants
opt to litigate in a federal forum. Once there, the litigant discovers that the
federal courts have concluded that there has been no violation of due process
with respect to their section 1983 claims since the mere existence of a state
remedy was all the process that was due.' 78 The logic of this approach hardly
seems ineluctable and is, if anything, circular, confusing and irrational.
Finally, the effect which this combination of procedural due process and
section 1983 analysis is having on substantive issues of procedural due process
is more serious. As Justice Powell noted in his Parratt concurrence, due process
decisions cannot be based merely on the existence or non-existence of potential
alternative relief. 179 Due process requires specific normative conduct and is not
alone a function of what other forums might be available.'" It imposes
substantive limitations on state action,' 8 ' which must be decided by balancing
the particular governmental action against the specific deprivations claimed by
the individual.'" Such rights should not be defined away by reference to possi-
ble outcome had a litigant proceeded in another forum. In its current ap-
proach, the Court is running the risk of losing the ability to distinguish between
different types of due process claims that will likely arise. It is locking itself into
a procedural approach, whereby it will be unable to separate a claim
legitimately in need of protection in the federal court from a claim for which
relief could just as well be obtained at the state level. This shortsighted course
of conduct can well end up denigrating the very rights which the due process
clause and section 1983 are meant to secure and to which the Court is giving
lip-service in the exhaustion cases.
'" See Whitman, supra note 8, at 6-7. She notes that 5 1983 litigation is not only an
"elaborate, and often unpredictable game," id. at 7, but that federal judges have elaborated
their own doctrines to dispose of specific cases. Id. at 6. Furthermore, courts who wish to
acknowledge certain § 1983 claims are forced to go out of their way to distinguish Supreme Court
precedent. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
"8 See, e.g., Creative Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 829-30 (1st Cir. 1982).
There the court found no procedural due process violation where a real estate development cor-
poration brought a § 1983 suit against municipal officers, rejecting plaintiff's assertion that it had
been denied a fair and meaningful hearing. The Court noted that the plaintiff had available ad-
ministrative hearings as well as state judicial review, citing Mathews v. Eldridge. Id. at 830. See
also Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir. 1982) (state remedies provide due process
where adopted children seized by county officials); Roslindale Cooperative Bank v. Greenwald,
638 F.2d 258, 261 (1st Cir. 1981) (state statutory proceeding satisfies due process requirements
where bank, its directors and shareholders claimed due process violations in certification of bank
by Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345,
1352 (9th Cir. 1981). See also supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
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 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 552-53 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
'°° Id.
18 ' Id. at 552. It should be noted, however, that Justice Powell wrote the opinion in In-
graham which was instrumental in creating the current due process problems. See supra notes
130-34 and accompanying text.
152 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The inherent tension between the federal and state court systems is par-
ticularly. prevalent in actions brought under section 1983. There is a pressing
need for the resolution of the problems raised by the existence of parallel feder-
al and state remedies. The Court has indicated its own awareness of this prob-
lem, both in terms of workload and of comity, and has, in fact, appealed to the
legislature for help.' 83 In the meantime, however, the Court has opted to deal
with the problem by injecting parallel state remedies into the content of the due
process clause rather than treating such state remedies as part of the jurisdic-
tional issue which they create.
The problem was Court created,'" however, and, at least until the legisla-
ture acts, should be dealt with by the Court in a forthright manner. One ap-
proach, repeatedly suggested, would be to reconsider the type of deprivations
which are constitutionally cognizable. This approach could take a number of
tacks. As suggested by Justice Powell in Goss v. Lopez," 5 Justice Stewart in Par-
raii186 and a number of lower courts, 187 some deprivations are simply not signif-
icant enough to trigger due process protection. Alternatively, as Justice Powell
suggests in Part-cat v. Taylor, negligent deprivations may not constitute depriva-
tions in the constitutional sense." 8 In effect, as some commentators have sug-
gested, the type of right which constitutes a legitimate property or liberty in-
terest may need to be reconsidered.' 89
Approaching the problem from the standpoint of the interest at stake and
the nature of the deprivation involves a piecemeal, step by step, approach
which the Court has indicated, through its appeal to the legislature to correct
the problem on a broad, statutory basis, it is unwilling to undertake. Further-
more, while this approach is forthright, it too solves a work distribution prob-
lem by defining rights rather than focusing on remedies. This approach also
can lead to a deprivation of rights rather than their ultimate protection by a dif-
ferent device.
A preferable solution to the problem would be to adopt the traditional ap-
proach taken in exhaustion cases, requiring some showing of the inadequacy of
a state remedy' 9° before allowing a case to proceed directly to federal court.' 9 '
'" Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2257, 2566-67 (1982).
'e4
	 supra notes 37-41, 72-74 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
'96
	 supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
1 " See, e.g., Raymon v. Alvord Indep. School Dist., 639 F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1981).
(Some rights may be so insubstantial that case is not cognizable under S 1983); Rutledge v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981).
188 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 21.
1 " This is the suggestion made by the appeals court in Patsy and rejected by the Supreme
Court. Patsy v. Florida State Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 912-14 (5th Cir. 1981), reu'd sub nom. Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
191
 This is not to say the holding in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2568
(1982), that no exhaustion of state remedies is required to bring a claim under 5 1983, should be
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Both Justice Brennan in his dissent in Paul v. Davis' 92 and the court in Rutledge
v. Arizona Board of Regents' 93 were concerned that the remedy, although ade-
quate in theory, might not be adequate in practice. Furthermore, such concern
about the adequacy of state remedies lay at the root of Monroe v. Pape.'" These
concerns appear to be overstated since the exhaustion doctrine currently con-
tains well-articulated exceptions to protect against a litigant being forced to a
fruitless resort to a state forum. 195
 This proposed use of the doctrine is consis-
tent with standard exhaustion analysis since it allows for decision of claims in-
itially by state decision makers but preserves the availability of federal courts to
step in to protect rights when there is no available state remedy 196 or when
another exception to exhaustion exists. 197 This proposal would have the desired
effect of addressing the problem in a straight-forward manner, clearing up con-
fusion and doctrinal impurities, and preserving section 1983 for exactly those
cases for which it was intended: cases where the states are, in fact, abusing the
individual's federally protected rights.
The solution allows full protection of individual rights. It furthers the
goals of the federal system by allowing the state courts to act as protectors of
federal rights yet assures national uniformity through potential Supreme Court
review. Furthermore, an existing exception to the exhaustion doctrine assures
immediate access to federal court where the protected rights of an individual
are willfully abridged by a state action. This would return federal civil rights
litigation to the bounds for which the statute was created — remedying only
that state action against citizens growing out of discriminatory conduct —
rather than providing an additional remedy for any possible harm done at the
hands of state actors.
The exhaustion approach should be adopted by the Court in the cases
presently awaiting decision so long as state remedies are in fact presently avail-
ignored. Rather, the limited exhaustion requirement suggested here addresses determinations of
whether a violation of procedural due process has occurred at all, following from the court's Par-
raft decision. Where there is found no adequate post-deprivation state remedy, no exhaustion of
such inadequate state remedies should be required before the substantive violations of a constitu-
tional right can be litigated under 5 1983 in federal court.
192 See supra notes 127.28 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 40-41, 60 and accompanying text.
"6
 For a thorough discussion of the presently recognized exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine as well as cases from the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts discussing these issues, see
Patsy v. Florida State Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902-12 (5th Cir. 1981), read sub nom. Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
196 To the extent that there is no state remedy, exhaustion is clearly not required. Id. at
903 and cases cited therein. Moreover to the extent that the individual has claims against the
state itself for failure to provide a remedy, these claims must be brought in state court because of
the eleventh amendment and are not proper subjects for federal court action even under the Civil
Rights Act. See Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 550
n.8 citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
197 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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able and adequate.'" The only questions the Court need face are the availabil-
ity and adequacy of the state remedy. If such avenues exist, the case should be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds alone and sent to the state system for deci-
sion.
Adoption of this proposal will ensure preservation of the purpose and
scope of the Civil Rights Act, protection of individual rights and a distribution
of workload which makes sense in terms of both the needs of the federal system
and principles of comity.
CONCLUSION
In its current approach to actions brought under section 1983, the Su-
preme Court has created considerable confusion. In effect, pretending to ad-
here to Monroe and McNeese, the court refuses to require the exhaustion of state
created remedies before a section 1983 action may be brought in federal court.
At the same time the court has chosen to make the substantive availability of
section 1983 to vindicate due process claims dependent on the mere existence of
a state remedy. This mixing of substance and procedure has serious doctrinal
and practical consequences and ill serves the interests of the courts, litigants
and both the federal and state systems. The problems caused by the Court's
present approach can best be remedied by adopting a requirement that before a
section 1983 can proceed the litigant show that the state procedure is in some
way inadequate. Such a requirement would serve to facilitate a proper distribu-
tion of work between federal and state systems while preserving the civil rights
acts for the preservation of federally created rights against actions by the states.
Nonetheless, whether this particular proposal is adopted is less important than
taking note that the present approach of the court is illogical and harmful.
196 A determination of adequacy is straight forward with respect to administrative
remedies, and would follow traditional exhaustion analysis. Where judicial remedies are in-
volved the plaintiff would need to make a showing that the defendants were somehow immune
under state law, that no state tort remedy existed, or that reliance on the state system would
result in a frustration of the protections for which S 1983 was enacted.
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